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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Is Khalid Khawar, who undertook no voluntary act to
influence the resolution of a public controversy, a private
figure?

2.

Does The Globe’s failure to investigate obvious and
available sources, its reputation for sensationalism, and
the inherent improbability of the story constitute reckless
disregard for the truth or falsity of the article published?

3.

Should the California Supreme Court reject adopting a
"neutral reportage privilege," because neither the
California legislature nor the United States Supreme Court
have recognized such a privilege?
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S054868

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
KHALID IQBAL KHAWAR,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
V.

GLOBE INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Defendant and Petitioner.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
This is an appeal from a jury verdict awarding Khalid Khawar
(Mr. Khawar) compensatory and punitive damages against The Globe
Int'l, Inc.

(The Globe) for defamation.

(C.T. 2780-83, 2790-91.)

Mr. Khawar filed suit against The Globe in March, 1990, after the
tabloid republished accusations that he assassinated Senator
Robert F. Kennedy.

(C.T. 137, 139.)

In March, 1994, a jury found that Mr. Khawar was a private
figure.

(C.T. 2782.)

It also found that The Globe (1) had

printed false and defamatory statements about Mr. Khawar;

(2) was

negligent in failing to learn whether the statements it printed
were false before publishing them;

(3) published its article with

reckless disregard as to whether the defamatory material was true
or false;

(4) published its article with malice or oppression
1

toward Mr. Khawar; and (5) published a neutral and accurate
report of the book upon which its article was based.
83.)

(C.T. 2781-

The jury awarded Mr. Khawar $675,000 in compensatory

damages and $500,000 in punitive damages.

(C.T. 2783, 2791.)

The trial court entered judgment on April 20, 1994.

(C.T. 3116.)

In June, 1994, The Globe filed a timely appeal to the
California Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District.
(C.T. 3130.)
verdict.

The appellate court upheld the lower court's

Khawar v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 92

(1996), review granted, September 25, 1996 {S046116).
appealed to this Court.

The Globe

(C.T, X.)
Statement of Facts

In 1968, Mr. Khawar covered the presidential election as a
free-lance photojournalist for a Pakistani periodical.
1336-37.)

(R.T.

On June 4, 1968, Mr. Khawar was at the Ambassador

Hotel in Los Angeles, California, to cover a speech given by
Robert Kennedy.

(R.T. 1338.)

Because Mr. Khawar was on the

podium with Kennedy, he appeared in photographs taken of Kennedy
just prior to Kennedy's assassination.

(R.T. 1339-40)

Khawar is now a farmer in Bakersfield, California.

Mr.

(R.T. 1355.)

The photographs of Mr. Khawar standing near Kennedy appeared
in a book by Robert Morrow, titled: "The Senator Must Die: The
Murder of Robert F. Kennedy."

(C.T. 156.)

identified Mr. Khawar as "Ali Ahmand."

The caption

(C.T. 156.)

Mr. Khawar,

referred to as Ali Ahmand, was identified as the "actual
2

assassin" of Senator Kennedy.
felon.

(R.T. 850.)

(C.T. 150.)

Morrow is a convicted

Another author who has written about

assassination conspiracy theories and who has met Morrow said
Morrow "wasn't playing with a full deck."

(R.T. 2151.)

One photograph from Morrow's book was printed in the April,
1989, issue of The Globe with an article accusing Mr. Khawar of
being a member of the mafia and killing Robert Kennedy.
3145.)

(C.T.

The Globe had superimposed a large arrow on the

photograph pointing at Mr. Khawar.

(R.T. 1357-58.)

The Globe

did not contact the police detective who headed the Kennedy
assassination investigation or the head of the state archives to
learn whether Mr. Khawar could have been Kennedy's true assassin.
(R.T. 702, 708, 957.)
The Globe article prompted calls to Mr, Khawar from all over
the world inquiring as to the accuracy of the article.
1364, 1366.)

(R.T.

The Khawar family also began receiving anonymous

threatening calls.

(R.T. 1366-67.)

As a result of the

publication, Mr. Khawar’s farmhouse was "egged," and his son's
car was vandalized twice.

(R.T. 1367, 1379.)

threats continued throughout the trial.

The anonymous

(R.T. 1367-68.)

This

caused Mr. Khawar to fear for the safety of his wife and
children, as well as for his own safety.

(R.T. 1360-61.)

Mr. Khawar contacted the Bakersfield police three times.
(R.T. 1379.)

A friend who had previously been with the

Bakersfield Police Department advised Mr. Khawar to consult with
3

a lawyer.

(R.T. 1366-67.)

After filing suit to clear his name,

Mr. Khawar was contacted by a newspaper and a local television
station asking him for interviews.

(R.T, 1368.)

Mr. Khawar

declined the interview with the newspaper, but he later gave one
interview to the television station as part of a report on the
story.

(R.T, 1369.)

In addition to the threats, Mr. Khawar, at

least through the trial, continued to have nightmares and to lose
sleep.

(R.T. 1369.)

The trial judge ruled as a matter of law that The Globe
article was not a neutral and accurate report, overturning the
jury's finding on the issue.

(R.T. 2740.)

no response from Mr. Khawar.

(R.T. 797 .)

The article included
This lack of balance

is indicative of a standard of reporting by The Globe which is
below acceptable levels of professional care.

(R.T. 797-98.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The lower court correctly found that Mr. Khawar was a
private figure, because the nature and extent of Mr. Khawar's
participation in the controversy did not make him a limited
purpose public figure.

Mr. Khawar is not a voluntary limited

purpose public figure because he took no voluntary actions to
influence the outcome of a controversy.
Mr. Khawar is not an involuntary limited purpose public
figure because neither the United States Supreme Court nor this
Court have firmly embraced this category of public figure.
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have focused
4

solely on the voluntary acts of the plaintiff, indicating that
the Court does not wish to develop the involuntary public figure
category.

Similarly, this Court has never adopted this category

of public figure.

This Court looks for evidence of affirmative

actions by which purported ’public figures* have thrust
themselves into the forefront of particular public controversies.
Even if this Court adopts the involuntary limited purpose
public figure category, Mr. Khawar does not meet the requirements
of any tests set forth by other courts.

Applying the facts of

this case to tests created by various federal Courts of Appeal,
Mr. Khawar is a private figure.

Thus, this Court should find

that Mr. Khawar is a private figure.
Independent review of all the evidence supports the lower
court’s finding that The Globe acted with actual malice.
malice may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

Actual

The Globe’s

failure to check an obvious and available source, the
publication's reputation for sensationalism, the inherent
improbability of the story, and the lack of necessity for rapid
dissemination of the information are all circumstantial evidence
of The Globe’s reckless disregard for the falsity of its
allegations.

Therefore, this Court should find that The Globe

acted with actual malice in publishing the defamatory article.
This Court should reject the neutral reportage privilege.
It is an unnecessary extension of media protection that the
United States Supreme Court has not recognized.
5

Although

promoting the free discussion of controversial events is a worthy
goal, current defamation law offers the media adequate protection
from defamation suits.

Even if this Court decided to adopt the

privilege, the privilege would not exonerate The Globe.

The

tabloid's article did not meet the requirements of the neutral
reportage privilege.
ARGUMENT
I.

KHALID KHAWAR IS A PRIVATE FIGURE UNDER TESTS SET FORTH BY
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME
COURT.
The trial court's determination of whether an individual is

a public or private figure is a mixed question of law and fact.
See Stolz V. KSFM 102 FM, 30 Cal. App. 4th 195, 204
denied, 116 S. Ct. 79 (1995).

(1994), cert,

The standard of review for an

appellate court is whether, after reviewing the entire record,
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s decision.
A.

Id.

Mr, Khawar is not a voluntary limited purpose public
figure because he took no voluntary actions to
influence the outcome of a controversy.

The United States Supreme Court, in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), stated that in considering whether an
individual is a limited purpose public figure^, a court should
look to "the nature and extent of an individual's participation
in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation."

'
"Some (individuals] occupy positions of such persuasive power and
influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes."
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 164 (1979)
(quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345). Mr. Khawar has not attained that
6

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.

A person should not be considered a

public figure solely because that person happens to be involved
in a controversy that is newsworthy; rather, to be considered a
public figure, an individual must have undertaken some voluntary
act through which he seeks to influence the resolution of the
public issues involved.

See Reader*s Digest Ass*n, Inc, v.

Superior Court (Synanon Church), 37 Cal. 3d 244, 254 (1984),
cert, denied sub nom,, Synanon Church v. Reader's Digest Ass*n,
478 U.S. 1009 (1986)

(citing Time, Inc, v. Firestone, 424 U.S.

448 (1976) and Wolston v. Reader*s Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S.
157 (1979)).
There is no evidence that Mr. Khawar undertook any voluntary
act to influence the resolution of the issues involved in a
controversy.

While Mr. Khawar voluntarily arranged to be at the

Ambassador Hotel and on the podium that evening, he was not
"seeking to influence the resolution of a controversy."

Mr.

Khawar went to the Ambassador Hotel to cover the election as a
photojournalist for a Pakistani publication, because he admired
Robert Kennedy and hoped to have his picture taken with him.
(R.T. 1340.)

Mr. Khawar undertook these voluntary actions

without regard to any controversy.

Subsequently, these actions

do not render him a voluntary limited purpose public figure.
Reader*s Digest Ass*n, 37 Cal. 3d at 254.

kind of status, and consequently is not a general purpose public
figure.
7

See

Mr. Khawar is also not a voluntary public figure, because
when these voluntary actions occurred, Kennedy had not yet been
assassinated, so there was no controversy to influence.

Because

Gertz requires an individual to inject himself into or to be
drawn into a particular public controversy, the Court presumed a
controversy existed before the individual was involved.
418 U.S. at 351.

Gertz,

In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. Ill (1979),

the Court directly addressed this issue.

There, the Court stated

that defendants cannot "create their own defense” by bringing
previously unknown individuals into the public eye.
443 U.S. at 135.

Hutchinson,

Mr. Khawar*s "voluntary actions” are

insufficient to confer public figure status upon him.

Id.

The one voluntary action that Mr. Khawar took after the
assassination was to defend himself against The Globe's attack by
granting an interview with a local television station.
1369.)

(R.T.

According to the United States Supreme Court, holding

repeated press conferences with the media does not, in and of
itself, establish public figure status.
424 U.S. 448, 455 n.3 (1976).

Time, Inc, v. Firestone,

In Firestone, Russel Firestone,

the heir to the "Firestone Tire" fortune, was involved in divorce
proceedings.

at 450-51.

Mrs. Firestone's marriage and her

social standing in the community afforded her the access to the
media to hold several press conferences during the trial.
Firestone, 424 U.S. at 450-51.
private figure.

Yet, the Court found her to be a

Id. at 455 n.3.
8

Mr. Khawar is not a socialite; he is a farmer.

(R.T. 1355.)

Mr. Khawar gave only one interview to the press, and this was
only to respond to the allegations made by The Globe.
1369.)

{R.T.

Mr, Khawar undertook no voluntary action to influence the

outcome of a public controversy; consequently, this Court should
find that Mr. Khawar is not a voluntary public figure.
B.

Mr. Khawar is not an involuntary limited purpose public
figure because, even if this category of public figure
does exist, he does not meet any of the requirements.
1.

Recent case law suggests that the United States
Supreme Court no longer recognizes this category
of public figure.

In Gertz, the Court, in a single sentence of dictum, stated
that, ”[h]ypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become
a public figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the
instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly
rare."

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.

However, the Court then

suggested that voluntary actions were the touchstone of the
public/private analysis.

Id.

The Court stated that, because

private individuals have not voluntarily exposed themselves to
the increased risk of defamation that public figures have, they
have "a more compelling call on the courts for redress of injury
inflicted by defamatory falsehood."

Id.

The Court has followed the "voluntary" requirement of this
latter statement fairly closely.

In the twenty three years since

Gertz, the United States Supreme Court has never found an
individual to be an involuntary public figure.
9

The Court has

cited the Gertz decision in 71 subsequent cases.

In none of

those 71 cases did the Court discuss involuntary public figures.
In the one case where the Court quoted the "being drawn into
a public controversy" language of Gertz, the language appeared in
a footnote as part of the entire Gertz quote on public figures.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 246 n.3 (1986)
(quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351.); see also Lorain Journal Co. v.
Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953, 961 (1985)

(Brennan, J., dissenting).

After Gertz, when presented with opportunities to embrace
the Gertz dictum, the Court instead inquired only into the
voluntary actions of the plaintiff.

In Firestone, the Court

addressed the public/private issue by challenging the utility of
the "drawn into" language mentioned in Gertz.
U.S. at 457.

Firestone, 424

The Court stated that while participants in some

litigation may be legitimate public figures, the majority will
more likely be "drawn into a public forum largely against their
will."

Id.

The Court went on to say that there was little

reason why these individuals should forfeit the protection which
the law would otherwise afford them "simply by virtue of their
being drawn into a courtroom.”

Id.

If the Court had wished to recognize an "involuntary public
figure" category, it could easily have done so in Firestone.
One year earlier the Seventh Circuit had discussed, in dicta in
Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976), the idea
that the wife of a famous entertainer "more or less automatically
10

becomes at least a part-time public figure herself."

Carson, 529

F.2d at 210; see also Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir.
1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978)

(finding children of

Julius and Ethyl Rosenberg to be public figures).

Had the United

States Supreme Court felt that such a category did exist for
family members of public figures, it could have applied it in
Firestone.

Instead, the Court took the opportunity to move

further away from the hypothetical involuntary language of the
Gertz decision.
Three years later the Court again refused to extend public
figure status to individuals who had taken no voluntary actions.
See Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135.

Ronald Hutchinson, director of

research at the Kalamazoo State Mental Hospital, sued Senator
William Proxmire after Proxmire, in a press release, criticized
Hutchinson's research as "transparent worthlessness" and
intimated that Hutchinson made a fortune at taxpayers' expense.
Id. at 114, 116.
figure.

The Court held that Hutchinson was not a public

Id. at 135 (considering Hutchinson's voluntary actions,

access to the media, and whether he had assumed a role of special
prominence).

The Court found that Hutchinson did not voluntarily

thrust himself to the forefront of a controversy.

See id.

Hutchinson's actions became the subject of public controversy
only as a result of Proxmire's actions in attacking Hutchinson's
research and questioning his motives.

Id.

Similarly, Mr. Khawar

became the subject of a controversy only after The Globe named
11

him as an assassin.

Few knew who Khalid Khawar was until The

Globe published its article.
The Court also found Hutchinson had insufficient access to
the media to adequately address the remarks made by Senator
Proxmire.

Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 136.

Hutchinson did not have

the "regular and continuing access to the media that is one of
the accouterments of having become a public figure.”

Id.

Similarly, Mr. Khawar had no access to the media other than to
respond to the allegations made by The Globe.

He possessed only

the "regular and continuing" access to the media that any potato
farmer does, and The Globe should not be allowed to profit from
that fact.

See id.

Lastly, the Court addressed the fact that Hutchinson had not
assumed a role of special prominence with regard to the specific
subject of the controversy.

Id. at 135-36.

Here, Mr. Khawar has

clearly not assumed any role of special prominence.
The Court could have found that Hutchinson was an
involuntary public figure.

Hutchinson clearly qualifies for

"being drawn” into a public controversy.

The public controversy

was the use and misuse of the public's taxes.

Id. at 114-16,

The Court chose not to consider this controversy as sufficient to
render Hutchinson a public figure,

id. at 135.

In its analysis, the Court cited the definition of a public
figure as set forth in Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, but excluded any
mention of involuntary public figures.
12
I

Id. at 134.

The Court

cited verbatim, the "hypothetical involuntary figure" paragraph
of Gertz, but conspicuously left out the first two lines dealing
with involuntary public figures.

Hutchinson. 443 U.S. at 134.

This reinforces the notion that the Court is increasingly
unwilling to confer public figure status on those who have done
nothing to warrant it.
In a later holding that further conflicted with the Gertz
dictum, the Court stated that although an individual's failure to
appear before a grand jury investigating Soviet espionage was
newsworthy, "[a] private individual is not automatically
transformed into a public figure just by becoming involved in or
associated with a matter that attracts public attention."
Wolston, 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979).

Wolston's refusal to appear

before a grand jury investigating espionage led to media scrutiny
and numerous subsequent articles about him.

^ at 162.

By

contrast, there was no such refusal here; Mr. Khawar cooperated
with police in their investigation.

(R.t. 1351.)

Nonetheless,

as the Wolston decision indicates, Mr. Khawar cannot be
transformed into a public figure simply by virtue of being
associated with this issue.

In light of these recent decisions,

there are serious doubts as to whether lower courts should
continue to afford the Gertz dictum any significance whatsoever.

13

2.

The California Supreme Court has never adopted
this category of public figure.

While the California Supreme Court has discussed the
possibility of the existence of this kind of public figure, as
every court quoting Gertz has, tests set forth by this Court
since Gertz do not appear to recognize the category.

See Vegod

Coro. V. ABC, Inc., 25 Cal. 3d 763, 769 (1979), cert, denied, 449
U.S. 886 (1980); s^ also Reader^s Digest Ass'n, Inc., 37 Cal. 3d
at 254.
In Vegod, this Court focused on the lack of voluntary
actions by the plaintiffs.

See Vegod, 25 Cal. 3d at 769.

This

Court stated that the plaintiffs "[could not] be said to have
thrown themselves into the vortex of that controversy.

.

.

.

Merely doing business with parties to a public controversy does
not elevate one to public figure status."

Id.

This Court addressed the issue again in Reader's Digest
Ass'n.

There, this Court was faced with the public figure

determination with regard to the Synanon Church and its founder,
Charles Dederich.

Reader's Digest Ass'n, 37 Cal. 3d at 252.

This Court stated that "courts should look for evidence of
affirmative actions by which purported 'public figures* have
thrust themselves into the forefront of particular public
controversies."

Id. 254-55 (emphasis added).

In making the

determination that they were public figures, this Court examined
plaintiffs "myriad attempts to thrust their case and Synanon in

14

general into the public eye."
at 255.

Reader’s Digest Ass'n, 37 Cal. 3d

This Court noted that "Synanon engaged in extensive

publicity campaigns in which it sought and achieved a favorable
reputation as an organization for the rehabilitation of drug
addicts.”

Id. at 255.

Here, there are no such affirmative actions by which Mr.
Khawar thrust himself to the forefront of a particular public
controversy.

Under this Court's holding in Reader's Digest

Ass'n, Mr. Khawar cannot be a public figure.

See supra Part I.A.

Like the United States Supreme Court, this Court has never
found any individual to be an involuntary public figure.

While

this is not dispositive, it does indicate this Court's continuing
reluctance to categorize individuals like Mr. Khawar, who have
taken no voluntary actions, as limited purpose public figures.
Because this Court has not adopted the category of involuntary
limited purpose public figure in the past, and because it would
be inapplicable in this case, this Court should not apply it now.
3.

Even if the California Supreme Court now chooses
to adopt this category, Mr. Khawar does not fit
within it under any of the tests adopted by other
courts.

Various federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have adopted tests
to determine limited purpose public figure status, although only
one has done so based upon the Gertz dicta.

In Dameron v.

Washington Magazine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986), the Court of Appeals modified the
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three-part test it had established in Waldbaum v. Fairchild
Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert, denied,
449 U.S. 898 (1980), to determine whether Mr. Dameron was a
limited purpose public figure.

Dameron, 779 F.2d at 741.

Under

this modified test the court had to determine (1) whether there
was a public controversy,

(2) whether the plaintiff played a

sufficiently central role in that controversy, and (3) whether
the defamatory remarks were relevant to the plaintiff's
involvement in the controversy.

Id.

Applying the facts of the case at bar to the test in Dameron
shows Mr. Khawar to be a private figure.

Even assuming a public

controversy existed when the article was published, Mr, Khawar
did not play a central role in that controversy.

Further, while

The Globe's article was relevant to Mr. Khawar's involvement in
the controversy, it was relevant only to the extent that it
created his role in that controversy.

Even if this Court were to

apply the Dameron concept of being drawn into a controversy by
"bad luck,** the factors of the Dameron test preclude a finding of
public figure status.
The Dameron Court inappropriately ascribed too much
significance to the Gertz dictum and has opened the door for the
media to attack those who would otherwise remain private
individuals.

The holding in Dameron was wrong, is contrary to

recent United States Supreme Court holdings, and should not be
followed by this Court.
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In Leman v. Flynt Distrib. Co.; Inc., 745 F.2d 123 (2ci Cir.
1984), cert, denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985), the Court of Appeals
held that to establish an individual is a limited purpose public
figure, a defendant must show the plaintiff:
"(1) successfully invited public attention to his views in
an effort to influence others prior to the incident that is
the subject of litigation; (2) voluntarily injected himself
into a public controversy related to the subject of the
litigation; (3) assumed a position of prominence in the
public controversy; and (4) maintained regular and
continuing access to the media.”
Leman, 745 F.2d at 136-37.
Applying this test to the facts of the case at bar clearly
indicates that Mr. Khawar is a private figure.

He did not

successfully invite public attention to his views, nor did he
voluntarily inject himself into any controversy.

He assumed no

position of prominence in the controversy, and he certainly had
no "regular and continuing access" to the media.

Thus, under

this test Mr. Khawar is a private figure.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
proposed a two-part test for determining whether a defamation
plaintiff is a limited purpose public figure,

Marcone v.

Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1082 {3d Cir.
1985) , cert, denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).

There, the court

stated that the Gertz decision called for consideration of (1)
whether the subject of the defamatory statement is a public
controversy, and if so,

(2) the "nature and extent" of the
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plaintiff’s involvement in the controversy.

See Marcone, 754

F.2ci at 1082.
Again, applying this test to the facts of the case at bar
shows that Mr. Khawar is a private figure.

As discussed earlier,

the United States Supreme Court has stated that a defendant
cannot create a controversy by making defamatory remarks, and
then claim a privilege based upon it being a public controversy.
See Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135,

Even assuming that a public

controversy existed prior to the publication, the second prong of
the test is not met.

Even a cursory examination of the nature

and extent of Mr. Khawar's involvement will show that he played
virtually no part in the controversy.
bystander.

Mr. Khawar was a

He took no active part in either the assassination or

the investigation that followed.

The extent of Mr. Khawar's

involvement was simply that he was present, by sheer bad luck, at
the assassination.

Even under the Dameron test, sheer bad luck

alone is not enough to establish public figure status.
Finally, in a recent case, Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC,
Inc., 37 F.3d 1541, 1553 (4th Cir. 1994), the Court of Appeals
formulated a five-part test for distinguishing public/private
figures.

Under this test, a court must determine whether (1) the

plaintiff had access to channels of effective communication;

(2)

the plaintiff voluntarily assumed a role of special prominence in
the public controversy;

(3) the plaintiff sought to influence the

resolution or outcome of the controversy;
18

(4) the controversy

existed prior to the publication of the defamatory statement; and
(5) the plaintiff retained public-figure status at the time of
the alleged defamation.

See Foretich, 37 F.3d at 1553.

When applying the facts of the case at bar to this test, Mr.
Khawar is clearly not a public figure.
effective access to the media.
any role of special prominence.
outcome of a controversy.

Mr. Khawar did not have

He had not voluntarily assumed
He did not seek to influence the

No controversy existed prior to the

publication by The Globe of the defamatory remarks.

Finally, Mr.

Khawar was not a public figure at the time of the defamation, nor
is he at this time.
There is substantial evidence to support the trial court's
finding that Mr. Khawar was a private figure.

The United States

Supreme Court, and all but one of the Circuit Courts^, have never
found any individual to be an involuntary public figure.

Given

these facts, coupled with the absence of voluntary actions by Mr.
Khawar, this Court should find Khalid Khawar to be a private
figure.
II.

THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THE GLOBE ACTED WITH ACTUAL MALICE
IN PUBLISHING THE ARTICLE.
The actual malice determination in a defamation suit

requires de novo review; it is not necessary for an appellate

’
See Dameron, 779 F.2d 736. While the Second and Seventh
Circuits have discussed the possibility of family members of public
figures becoming public figures, both did so in the context of
"general purpose public figures," rather than involuntary limited
purpose public figures. See Meeropol, 560 F.2d at 1066; see also
Carson, 529 F.2d at 210 (dictum).
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court to review the "entire" record; rather, only those portions
of the record that relate to the actual malice determination must
be independently assessed.

See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of

United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 n.31 (1984), reh'g denied,
467 U.S. 1267 (1967); see also McCoy v. Hearst Corp., 42 Cal. 3d
835, 839 (1986), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).

In

performing the review, however, "due regard" must be given to the
trial judge's opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses.

See Bose, 466 U.S. at 500.

Liability under the New York Times "actual malice" standard
requires a plaintiff to prove that the statement was made with
knowledge of falsehood, or with reckless disregard for the truth.
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S, 254, 279-80 (1964).
To prove reckless disregard in a defamation case, there must be
either (1) sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the
defendant entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication, or (2) obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the
informant or the accuracy of his reports.
Thompson, 390 U.S, 727, 731-32 (1968).

See St. Amant v.

"Publishing with such

doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and
demonstrates actual malice,”

Id. at 731.

A plaintiff may prove actual malice by use of circumstantial
evidence.

See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc, v. Connaughton,

491 U.S. 657, 668 (1989).

Here, there is substantial

circumstantial evidence to justify a finding of actual malice.
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In Harte-Hanks, the Court stated that failure to check an
obvious and available source can be viewed as evidence of actual
malice.

Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 692-93.

Here, Blackburn, the

author of The Globe's article, never contacted any law
enforcement agency that investigated the assassination to inquire
about the validity of the accusations.

(R.T. 957.)

Blackburn is

not even certain that he interviewed Mr. Morrow, the author of
the book.

(R.T. 1098.)

Blackburn never called the Los Angeles

Police Department to ask if a man named Ahmand, Iqbal or Khawar
could have killed Kennedy.

(R.T. 957.)

He did not call the

California State Archives, from whom he could have obtained all
video and photographs taken that evening on one composite video
tape.

(R.T. 710.)
While Blackburn states he "believes he checked with LA

directory assistance" about Ali Ahmand, he did not ask for
information regarding Khalid Khawar.

(R.T. 1121-22.)

Blackburn’s statement that he did not know who Khalid Khawar was,
(R.T. 1122), is indicative of the lack of research done and of
Blackburn’s credibility as a witness, since he claims to have
read Mr. Morrow’s book "from cover to cover."

(R.T. 1101.)

In

Morrow’s book Ahmand and Khawar were stated to be the same
individual.

(R.T. 705.)

As stated, Blackburn investigated none

of Morrow's sources, nor any of the agencies or individuals that
might have provided evidence that the story was false.

These

were obvious and available sources that no representative of The
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Globe made any effort to contact.

This evidence of purposeful

avoidance of the truth is sufficient to satisfy the New York
Times standard.

See Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 692-93.

St. Amant, the Court stated that inherent improbability
in a particular story is evidence of reckless disregard for truth
or falsity.

St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732.

Here, there had been an

extensive investigation, including police interviews with Mr.
Khawar and everyone else present at the Ambassador Hotel that
evening.

(R.T. 1351.)

Sirhan Sirhan had already been arrested,

tried and convicted when Blackburn wrote the article, and
Blackburn knew of this.

(R.T. 1143.)

Twenty years had passed

and, until Morrow's book, there had been no mention of Mr. Khawar
being involved in the assassination.

Given these facts, the

likelihood that this story was true was inherently improbable.
These facts indicate reckless disregard for truth or falsity.
Courts have also considered the publication's reputation for
sensationalism as evidence of actual malice.
Co. V. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967)

In Curtis Publ'g

(Warren, C.J., concurring).

Chief Justice Earl Warren, in addressing the actual malice
requirement, cited "sophisticated muckraking designed to provoke
people, make them mad" as indicative of actual malice.
388 U.S. at 169.

Curtis,

In that case, in the early days of tabloid

journalism, the Saturday Evening Post had embarked upon a
campaign to increase magazine sales by making deceiving and
outrageous claims,

id.

Here, the same factors are at work.
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The

Globe seized upon the writings of a convicted felon^,

(R.T.

850.)f to sell magazines, edited them to make them more
titillating,

(R.T. 829, 858.), and now seeks to invoke the First

Amendment as a shield against civil prosecution.
Whether or not the issue involved was "hot news" is another
factor the Curtis Court discussed as relevant to the question of
reckless disregard for the truth.

Curtis, 388 U.S. at 157-59,

There, the Court considered the "necessity for rapid
dissemination" of the information in the article as probative of
whether it acted with reckless disregard by publishing without
investigating.

Id. at 158-59.

There, the Court held that the

story was "in no sense hot news.”

Id. at 157.

Similarly, the

assassination of Robert Kennedy had occurred more than twenty
years earlier, and there had already been a criminal trial and
conviction.

This was not "hot news."

In St. Amant, the Court stated that reckless disregard could
not be fully encompassed in "one infallible definition," and that
its outer limits would inevitably be determined by case-by-case
adjudication.

St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731.

In the future, this

Court may be faced with a case that pushes those outer limits.
However, this case requires no such redefinition of the
boundaries.

There is clear and convincing evidence that The

^ Additionally, recklessness may be found where there are obvious
reasons to doubt the veracity of one's sources. See St. Amant, 390
U.S. at 732. Blackburn read Morrow's book "cover to cover." (R.T.
1101.) The book states that Morrow was a convicted felon.
(R.T.
850) .
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Globe acted with reckless disregard in its publication of these
damaging remarks.

The right result was reached by the trial and

appellate courts, and this Court should affirm their holdings.
III. CALIFORNIA SHOULD NOT ADOPT THE JUDGE-MADE "NEUTRAL
REPORTAGE PRIVILEGE."
Whether or not California courts should adopt the neutral
reportage privilege is a question of law which is reviewed de
novo.

See Rosenbaum v. Security Pac. Corp., 43 Cal. App. 4th

1084, 1089 (1996), review denied, 1996 Cal. LEXIS 3709 (Cal. June
26, 1996}

(noting that whether to expand common law

landlord/tenant duty first created in another jurisdiction is a
question of law the court reviews de novo).
A.

The neutral reportage privilege is based loosely on
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
but is an unnecessary extension of freedom of speech
law.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
created the neutral reportage privilege, which offers the media
more protection in defamation suits than they enjoyed under
common law.

See Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'v> Inc., 556

F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).

The

Second Circuit held that the media are protected in defamation
suits even when they print possibly false statements, so long as
they report the charges fairly and accurately.

I^ at 120.

Adopting the privilege is inappropriate, because the privilege is
not consistent with United States Supreme Court jurisprudence.
See Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 583 F.2d 1221, 1225 (3rd Cir. 1978).
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The neutral reportage privilege created by Edwards protects
journalists who reprint defamatory charges against public
figures, even if reporters doubt the truth of the statements/
Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.

In Edwards, the New York Times

reprinted accusations first made by the National Audubon Society
in its publication American Birds.

Id. at 118.

The Times

article reprinted accusations that scientists who use bird count
statistics to downplay the effects of the insecticide DDT are
"paid to lie."

See id.

The Second Circuit held that the First

Amendment protects these defamatory statements as a "fair and
dispassionate reporting of an unfortunate but newsworthy
contretemps."

Id. at 120.

Under Edwards, there are four factors a news report must
meet in order to qualify for the neutral reportage privilege:
first, the report must be about a public figure; second, the
statements in the report must be newsworthy; third, the charges
in the report must be reported "fairly and accurately;" and
fourth, the charges in the report must come from a responsible
source.

Id. at 120, 122.

The First T^endment should protect the media because of the
value of informing the public about controversial issues.
120.

Id. at

However, the neutral reportage privilege extends media

^ Under common law, both defendants who first print defamatory remarks
and those who reprint defamatory remarks are equally liable for
defamation. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 578 (1977).
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protection beyond what has been authorized by the United Supreme
Court, and the media enjoy sufficient protection under existing
constitutional law.^

Dickey, 583 F.2d at 1225.

In Dickey, CBS aired statements by a Congressman accusing
Dickey of accepting payoffs.

See id. at 1222, 1224.

The Third

Circuit ruled that adopting the privilege would be inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's ruling in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727 (1968), which held that libel against a public figure is
shown when a defendant has serious doubts about the truth of the
publication.

Dickey, 583 F.2d at 1225.

The Dickey court instead

applied the "actual malice" standard, holding that this offered
the media enough protection.

Id. at 1227.

Adopting the neutral reportage privilege is unnecessary
because the United States Supreme Court has not adopted it, and
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
sufficient protection.

(1964), offers media

Janklow v. Viking Press, 378 N.W.2d 875,

880-81 (S.D. 1985); see also McCall v. Courier-Journal and
Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882, 886-87 (Ky. 1981), cert,
denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982)

(declining to adopt the privilege

also because other jurisdictions have criticized it).

In

Janklow, the Supreme Court of South Dakota refused to apply the
^ others have argued that the Second Circuit misinterpreted the First
Amendment in Edwards, because the Supreme Court places no
constitutional value on protecting defamatory statements. See Dennis
J. Dobbels, Comment, Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc.: A
Constitutional Privilege to Republish Defamation Should be Rejected,
33 Hastings L.J. 1203, 1224-25 (1982).
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neutral reportage privilege to a book about a former state
attorney general, holding that the media are adequately shielded
under New York Times when they print defamatory facts and
opinion.

Janklow, 378 N.W.2d at 876, 881.

This Court should reject the neutral reportage privilege
created by the Second Circuit, because the Supreme Court has not
approved it and because it has been criticized in other
jurisdictions as being an unnecessary extension of defamation
law.

See McCall, 623 S.W.2d at 886-87.

The United States

Supreme Court's "actual malice" test offers The Globe generous
protection in defamation suits.
B.

See Dickey, 583 F.2d at 1227.

The neutral reportage privilege does not place enough
value on an individual's reputation and right to
privacy.

California courts place a high value on an individual's
right to privacy.
746 (1989).

See Brown v. Kelly Broad. Co., 48 Cal. 3d 711,

The state constitution protects an individual's

interest in protecting his or her reputation.

Id.

Protecting a

person's reputation is more important than adopting a new media
privilege which would expand the media's right to free speech.
See id.
The California Constitution declares that "[a]11 people are
by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights.
Among these are .

. . pursuing and obtaining . . . privacy."

Cal. Const, art. I, § 1.

The state constitution also protects

the right to free speech, stating, "[e]very person may freely
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speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of this right."
I, § 2(a)

Cal. Const, art.

(emphasis added); cf. U.S. Const, amend. I

(stating

that Congress shall not abridge freedom of speech).
The California Supreme Court has recognized the state
constitutional right to privacy when balancing it with the
importance of protecting the media in defamation lawsuits.
Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 746.

See

In Brown, a television station accused

the plaintiff of making serious mistakes in a home remodeling
job.

at 719-20.

This Court noted that the state

constitution offers more protection to defamation victims than
the federal constitution.

Id. at 746.

Creating a new media

privilege would run against the California Constitution's
protection of defamation plaintiffs.

Id.

Here, adopting the neutral reportage privilege would violate
Mr. Khawar's constitutional right to protect his reputation.
id.

See

The Globe is responsible for abusing its right to free

speech.

See id.; see also Cal. Const, art. I, § 2(a).

It is

more important to shield Mr. Khawar from the detrimental effects
of the accusation that he assassinated Senator Kennedy than it is
to create a new media protection for The Globe.
Cal. 3d at 746.
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See Brown, 48

C.

The neutral reportage privilege is incompatible with
California libel law.

The media enjoy no "public interest" privilege under
California law to publish defamatory statements.
3d at 724.

Brown, 48 Cal.

State laws that protect the media cannot be used to

violate a citizen's important right to privacy.

See Rancho La

Costa, Inc, v. Superior Court (Penthouse Int'l, Ltd.), 106 Cal.
App. 3d 646, 667 (1980), cert, denied sub nom.. Penthouse Int'l
V. Rancho La Costa,

Inc., 450 U.S. 902 (1981).

The California Civil Code defines a privileged publication
as one made:
In a communication, without malice, to a person interested
therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or (2) by one
who stands in such relation to the person interested as to
afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the
communication to be innocent, or (3) who is requested by the
person interested to give the information.
Cal. Civ. Code § 47(c)

(West Supp. 1997).

This Court held that

section 47(c)^ does not create a broad public-interest privilege
for the news media.

Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 725.

The Court

rejected the defendants' claim that section 47(c) applies to all
communications which are of "public interest,"

Id.

Section

47(3) was not meant to grant a sweeping privilege to the news
media.

Id. at 727.

The state legislature passed the statute

only to codify the narrow "common interest" privilege found at
common law.

See id.
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In Rancho, Penthouse Magazine printed an article which
accused resort owners of being connected to organized crime.
Rancho, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 649.

The magazine claimed that this

article was privileged under section 47(c) because there was a
general public interest in the resort.

Id. at 664.

The court

held that the word "interested" in section 47(c) does not refer
to readers' general interest in the subject of a newspaper
article.

at 664-65.

Rather, "interested" refers to a more

"direct and immediate concern."

Id. at 664.

The court ruled

that this narrow privilege does not apply to widely-read,
national publications which publish defamatory remarks.

Id. at

668.
There, the court compared the importance of the right to
privacy with the importance of the right of free speech.
667.

Id. at

The court said the right of free speech does not allow the

media to violate a citizen's right to privacy by printing
defamatory statements.

Id.

This statutory interpretation is

consistent with judicial interpretation of the state's
constitutional right to privacy.

See supra Part III.B.

Adopting the neutral reportage privilege in California would
not be consistent with California libel law.
3d. at 729.

See Brown, 46 Cal.

Although California Civil Code section 47(c)

provides a narrow "common interest" privilege, this does not

® The California Supreme Court based its decision in Brown on
California Civil Code section 47(3), which is now section 47(c).
wording of the current statute is the same.
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The

cover the broad "newsworthy" criteria of the neutral reportage
privilege.

Rancho, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 664-65.

The neutral

reportage privilege allows the media to reprint defamatory
charges in some circumstances, which would violate California's
valued right to privacy.

See id. at 667.

If this Court adopts the neutral reportage privilege,
future defamation victims will suffer under a heavy
burden of proof in order to recover.
Expanding media protection "would effectively preclude
recovery by a defamed private individual."
at 746.

See Brown, 48 Cal. 3d

Creating the neutral reportage privilege was unnecessary

in the first place; thus, it means defamation victims face
another hurdle in court.

See James E. Boasberg, With Malice

Toward None: A New Look at Defamatory Republication and Neutral
Reportage, 13 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 455, 466 (1991).
Adopting the neutral reportage privilege would mean that
defamation victims would have to prove more than actual malice
when trying to recover.

See id.

The Second Circuit pointed out

that the plaintiff in Edwards did not prove actual malice by the
Times or that the Times reporter doubted the truth of the Audubon
Society's accusations.

Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120-21.

Absent this

showing, the plaintiff would have lost its defamation claim
anyway, and adopting neutral reportage was not necessary to
exonerate the Times.

Boasberg, 13 Hastings Comm. & Ent, L.J, at

467.
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Adopting the neutral reportage privilege would allow fewer
defamation victims to recover for a violation of their right to
privacy, because courts could dismiss more claims on summary
judgment.

Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1124 n.l6

(N.D. Cal. 1984).

In Barry, Sports Illustrated printed

accusations that a college basketball coach had illegally
funneled money to a star player.

See id. at 1112.

The district

court applied the neutral reportage privilege when granting
summary judgment to defendant, holding that the First Amendment
protects neutral reporting of accusations.

Id. at 1124, 1128.

The Barry court pointed out that the privilege applies
regardless of a defendant's subjective state of mind, unlike the
"actual malice" standard, which requires an inquiry into a
defendant's knowledge about his or her story.

Id. at 1124 n.l6.

The court called this a "practical advantage for defendants,"
because a standard that does not probe a defendant's state of
mind is more appropriate for summary judgment.

Id.

This would

rob plaintiffs from having a chance to have their claims heard in
court,

id.

The First Amendment affords the media a high level of
protection, which means it is difficult for plaintiffs to recover
when the media harm their reputations.

Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 746.

This Court rejected as speculative defendants' arguments that
holding the media to a higher standard of care would have a
"chilling effect" on reporting the news.
32

See id.

The media are

already protected by the actual malice standard when they print
defamatory remarks.

See Brown, 48 Cal, 3d at 746.

IV. EVEN IF CALIFORNIA COURTS ADOPTED THE "NEUTRAL REPORTAGE
PRIVILEGE," IT WOULD NOT EXONERATE THE GLOBE BECAUSE THE
ARTICLE DOES NOT SATISFY THE ELEMENTS OF THE PRIVILEGE.
A,

Mr. Khawar is not a public figure.

The neutral reportage privilege applies to reports about
public figures.

Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, Inc., 556

F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
Mr. Khawar is a private figure.

See supra Part. I,

Therefore,

the neutral reportage privilege would not apply to stories about
him.

See Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.
B.

The Globe article was not a neutral and accurate
report, because it was not balanced and did not include
a response from Mr. Khawar.

The neutral reportage privilege does not extend to one-sided
stories which do not include a response from a person accused of
a crime.

Cianci v. New Times Publ'g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 69 (2nd

Cir. 1980).

The privilege covers stories which include reactions

from those accused of wrongdoing.

See Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.

Publications which distort accusations or appear to agree with
them lose the protection of the privilege.

Id.

The Edwards court noted that the reporter had made a good
faith effort to get both sides of the story, stating that this
balance was part of the "fair and dispassionate reporting" that
allowed the article to qualify for the neutral reportage
privilege.

Id. at 118, 120.
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Being fair also means being neutral and not espousing the
views of an accuser.

See Edwards/ 556 F.2d at 120.

Publishers

who deliberately distort statements lose the protection of
neutral reportage.

Id.

In Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1127 (N.D. Cal.
1984), the court suggested that it would not have applied the
privilege if the article in question did not include both sides
of the controversy surrounding possibly illegal recruiting
practices, as other articles covered by the privilege had done.
The article also included information about the credibility of
those malcing the accusations against the coach, which allowed the
public to act as "the . . . arbiter of the truth of [the]
accusations made."
Cianci, the same court that decided Edwards considered a
case where a magazine printed a story about a Rhode Island mayor
who had faced accusations of rape more than a decade before
taking office.

Cianci, 639 F.2d at 56.

The magazine knew the

mayor's side of the story, but the article did not include his
claim of innocence or his version of what had happened.
69.

Id. at

The Second Circuit rejected applying the neutral reportage

privilege, in part because the article was not balanced.

Id,

Journalists should use special caution when reporting criminal
allegations.

See id. at 63-64.

Here, The Globe did not include a reaction from Mr. Khawar.
(C.T. 3145)

Unlike the journalists in Cianci, The Globe failed
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to check public records which would have proven Mr. Khawar's
innocence.

The Globe should have printed a reaction from Mr.

Khawar in order to qualify for the neutral reportage privilege.
See Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.

This is especially true in this

case, because The Globe was accusing Mr. Khawar of a crime.
Cianci, 639 F.2d at 63-64.

See

The Globe should have included

accurate information about Morrow's credibility so readers could
weigh whether they should believe the accusations against Mr,
Khawar.

See Barry, 584 F. Supp. at 1127.

The Globe lost any

claim to the neutral reportage privilege when it deliberately
distorted the picture of Mr. Khawar by using an arrow to point
him out and lightening the picture,
Khawar more identifiable.

(R.T. 2744.), to make Mr.

S^ Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.

The

trial judge determined as a matter of law that because of those
distortions. The Globe's article was not a neutral and accurate
report.
C.

(R.T. 2744.)
The Globe article was not based on information from a
reliable source.

Even when an article is one-sided, it should be based on
"substantially true" information from a reliable source in order
to be considered for constitutional protection.
V. Block,

See Weingarten

102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 150 (1980), cert, denied, 449

U.S, 899 (1980).

The neutral reportage privilege protects

accusations which come from "responsible and well-noted" sources.
Edwards, 556 F.2d at 122.

In order for the privilege to apply.
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the defamer must be prominent.

Barry, 584 F. Supp. at 1126.

The court which created the neutral reportage privilege has
also placed limits on it in order to prevent giving the media
"absolute immunity" to present the most unjustified accusations
it wants.

Cianci, 639 F.2d at 69-70.

The media should not be

able to launch unwarranted attacks on citizens based on "episodes
long in the past and made by persons known to be of scant
reliability."

Id^ at 70.

Granting new privileges to the media

could lead to protection of almost every story the media wanted
to print.

See Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 725.

In Meinqarten, the court held that a reporter who wrote
about a former Seaside city attorney did not have to get his side
of the story or verify information for the story.
102 Cal. App. 3d at 147-48.

Weingarten,

In fact, the court stated that the

First Amendment does not protect only those stories which are
undeniably true.

I^ at 151.

However, the court held that the

reporter had no reason to believe that the story was false, and
every statement in the article was based on information from an
"identifiable source."

Id. at 150.

The Weingarten court cited the Edwards opinion but did not
adopt the neutral reportage privilege.

S^ i^ at 148.

The

opinion espoused the general goal of informing the public; it did
not specifically mention the neutral reportage privilege.

I^

In Edwards, allegations that some scientists are "paid to
lie" about DDT came from the Audubon Society.
36

Edwards, 556 F.2d

at 117.

A "highly respected" bird watcher first made the

accusations in a forward to an issue of the Audubon Society's
publication, American Birds, which included a statistical report
of bird sightings,

Edwards, 556 F,2d at 116.

The court referred

to the Audubon Society as "a responsible and well-noted
organization,"

Id. at 122.

Allowing The Globe to print such outlandish accusations
about Mr, Khawar without having to verify them would be granting
the newspaper absolute immunity to launch an unjustified attack
against Mr. Khawar.

See Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 725.

Morrow's book

was merely a new theory; it was not based on substantially true
allegations.

(R.T. 956.)

Because The Globe's article was not

based on charges from a reliable source, it does not deserve the
protection of the neutral reportage privilege.

See Edwards, 556

F.2d at 122.
D.

The Globe article was not newsworthy.

The Second Circuit created the neutral reportage privilege
in order to protect newsworthy comments that might otherwise be
suppressed.

Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120, 122.

The privilege

applies to accusations made about a figure who is embroiled in a
controversy before the publication of the article.
F. Supp. at 1126.
prints.

Barry, 584,

A publication cannot create the controversy it

See id.; see also Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. Ill,

135 (1979).
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The Edwards opinion emphasized that there was a controversy
raging around the use of DDT that touched on "fundamental
questions of value."

Edwards, 556 F.2d at 115-16.

One reason

the court decided to grant the Times the neutral reportage
privilege was because of the importance of fully informing the
public about the controversial issue.

Id. at 120.

The Barry court said the neutral reportage privilege applied
when charges were made by "one participant in an existing public
controversy against another participant in that controversy."
Barry, 584 F. Supp. at 1126 (emphasis added).

The university

where Barry worked had already begun an investigation into the
coach's alleged wrongdoing when Sports Illustrated printed its
article.

I^ at 1112.

controversy.

The article did not create the

See id.

Here, The Globe created the controversy.

There was no

debate raging around the assassination of Senator Kennedy.
2153.)

(R.T.

Sirhan Sirhan had been convicted of the murder more than

20 years before The Globe article was printed, and no credible
sources had accused Mr. Khawar of the crime.
956.)

(C.T. 3145, R.T.

Although there are many "conspiracy theories" surrounding

the assassinations of Senator Kennedy and his brother, Mr. Khawar
was not a "participant" in any "existing public controversy" when
The Globe published its defamatory article.
Supp. at 1126.

S^ Barry, 584 F.

No formal criminal investigation had been

launched into Mr. Khawar's activities the night of Kennedy's
38

assassination.

Because The Globe article was not newsworthy and

Mr. Khawar was not a part of a controversy when the article was
published, the neutral reportage privilege does not apply.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Khawar is a private figure because he took no
affirmative actions to influence the outcome of a public
controversy.

There is clear and convincing proof that The Globe

acted with actual malice in publishing the article.

This Court

should reject the neutral reportage privilege because the
defamation standard presented by the United States Supreme Court
provides adequate protection to the media.

Even if this Court

chooses to adopt the neutral reportage privilege, the new
standard would not exonerate The Globe, because the article about
Mr. Khawar did not meet the minimum requirements of the
privilege.

Accordingly, this Court should affirm each of the

lower court's findings.

Dated:

October 30, 1997

Respectfully submitted.
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